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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-1964 
____________ 
 
CASIMIRO HERNANDEZ-SUAREZ, 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                          Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A087-548-119) 
Immigration Judge: Eugene Pugliese 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 4, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Casimiro Hernandez-Suarez (“Hernandez”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
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 Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1994 
without inspection.  In 2009, Hernandez was placed in removal proceedings pursuant to a 
Notice To Appear, which charged that he is removable under Immigration & Nationality 
Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the 
United States without having been admitted or paroled.  It is undisputed that Hernandez 
is removable as charged.  On January 20, 2011, after proceedings had been transferred to 
Newark, New Jersey, Hernandez, with the assistance of counsel, sought and was granted 
voluntary departure pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (“The Attorney General may 
permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense … in 
lieu of being subject to proceedings under section 1229a … or prior to the completion of 
such proceedings, if the alien is not deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 
1227(a)(4)(B)….”).  
 Hernandez then retained new counsel, and, on April 15, 2011, he filed a timely 
motion to reopen in Immigration Court, claiming that he had received ineffective 
assistance from his first counsel; and requesting the opportunity to apply for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.  
Hernandez claimed that his former counsel incorrectly advised him that he was ineligible 
for any form of relief from removal.  He further contended that he was eligible for 
asylum or the other related relief because of his fear of returning to Mexico, a fear that 
was based on an increase in drug-cartel violence, see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) 
(asylum application timeliness requirement excused where alien demonstrates “either the 
existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for 
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asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application”).   A 
number of items were attached to the motion to reopen, including Hernandez’s affidavit, 
in which he contended, among other things, that Mexico’s drug-cartel violence was 
“fueled by Americans’ demand of illegal drugs and their ever-growing arsenal of easily 
available weapons,” A.R. 137; a copy of an attorney ethics grievance form; another 
affidavit from Hernandez in support of the ethics grievance form; and the State 
Department Travel Warning dated September 10, 2010, which, among other things, 
discusses how innocent bystanders have been killed as the Government of Mexico has 
deployed the military and federal police to combat the drug cartels.   
 On May 2, 2011, the Immigration Judge denied the motion to reopen on the 
ground that it did not contain the required Form I-589 application for asylum.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (“Any motion to reopen for the purpose of acting on an 
application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and 
all supporting documents.”).   
On May 9, 2011, Hernandez submitted a motion for reconsideration or to reopen 
with the IJ.  In this motion, counsel asked the IJ to reconsider his decision to deny the 
motion to reopen because the omission of the asylum application from the motion was 
due to a “clerical error;” the asylum application and the required fee had actually been 
mailed to the Nebraska Service Center.  A receipt for the application from the Nebraska 
Service Center was attached, as was a copy of Hernandez’s asylum application.  In that 
application, Hernandez claimed to be a member of a social group of “non-gang 
members,” and he stated that he had been attacked by gang members in 1993, which 
4 
 
prompted his decision to come to the United States.  The Department of Homeland 
Security opposed reconsideration of the order denying the motion to reopen, arguing that 
the reconsideration motion had failed to specify any errors of fact or law in the IJ’s prior 
decision, see id. at § 1003.23(b)(2).  The IJ agreed and denied the motion for 
reconsideration on June 14, 2011. 
Hernandez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the IJ, in 
denying his motion for reconsideration, failed to credit his explanation for the missing 
asylum application, and, in doing so, the IJ violated his Fifth Amendment right to due 
process.  Hernandez relied on a case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Yeghiazaryan v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006), to support his argument.  
Hernandez also repeated the arguments in his original motion to reopen concerning his 
first counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, and his prima facie eligibility for asylum or related 
relief based on his fear of returning to Mexico. 
   On March 14, 2013, the Board dismissed Hernandez’s appeal on the ground that a 
motion to reconsider in which counsel merely seeks to correct her original filing mistakes 
does not state a factual or legal error in the IJ’s decision.  In the alternative, the Board 
held that Hernandez had not demonstrated materially changed conditions in Mexico or 
that he was prejudiced by his first counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, such that he should 
be permitted to file an asylum application.  The Board reasoned that Hernandez’s first 
counsel could reasonably have concluded that seeking an extended period for voluntary 
departure was superior to filing an asylum application that had little likelihood of success.  
The Board rejected Hernandez’s claim of a protectable social group consisting of “non-
5 
 
gang members,” and, in addition, concluded that Hernandez had made no showing that 
the Government of Mexico would acquiesce in his torture for purposes of establishing the 
need for CAT protection.  The Board ordered Hernandez’s removal to Mexico pursuant 
to the alternate order of removal issued by the IJ on January 20, 2011.  
 Hernandez timely petitions for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(1), (b)(1).  In his brief seeking review of the Board’s decision affirming the 
denial of the IJ’s decision denying his motion for reconsideration, Hernandez has 
repeated the argument he made before the Board that his explanation for the missing 
asylum application was not properly credited in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to 
due process, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 17-21 (citing Yeghiazaryan, 439 F.3d 994).  He 
also argues that the Board failed to properly apply our “reasonable likelihood (that the 
result would have been different if the alleged error by counsel had not occurred)” 
standard in concluding that he was not prejudiced by his first counsel’s advice to seek 
only voluntary departure, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 21-23 (citing Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007)); and he argues that the Board failed to consider 
and discuss his evidence in determining that he did not establish a prima facie case for 
asylum, see Petitioner’s Brief, at 24-29 (citing Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260 
(3d Cir. 2008)). 
   We will deny the petition for review.  Review of the agency’s denial of a motion 
for reconsideration is for abuse of discretion only.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 
166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  See also Immigration & Nationality Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 
314, 323 (1992).  Discretionary decisions will not be disturbed unless they are arbitrary, 
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irrational, or contrary to law.  See Tipu v. Immigration & Nationality Serv., 20 F.3d 580, 
582 (3d Cir. 1994).  A motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by 
specifying the errors of fact or law in the Immigration Judge’s prior decision and shall be 
supported by pertinent authority.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2).  Here, it is undisputed that 
the IJ’s original decision to deny Hernandez’s motion to reopen for failure to include the 
required asylum application was correct under the applicable regulation.   
Because the asylum application clearly was omitted from the original motion to 
reopen, Hernandez asked the IJ to reconsider, that is, to excuse or forgive the deficiency 
because the error had been inadvertent.  The IJ declined to do so, citing the standard for 
reconsideration.  On appeal, the Board was not persuaded by Yeghiazaryan, 439 F.3d 
994, that a due process violation had resulted from the IJ’s refusal to reconsider the order 
denying reopening.  We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in this 
respect.  In Yeghiazaryan, the court reversed the Board because it had summarily denied 
the alien’s motion to reopen for failure to provide supporting documentation before the 
90-day window for filing a motion to reopen had closed.  The court was persuaded to do 
so because the alien’s new counsel had entered the case at a “very late stage,” and had 
laid out the bases for the motion and notified the Board that the supporting evidence 
would be forthcoming within the prescribed time for filing a motion to reopen.  439 F.3d 
at 1000.  Here, in contrast, the IJ denied Hernandez’s motion to reopen for failure to 
submit the required asylum application after the 90-day window had closed, and counsel 
did not notify the IJ that the missing supporting documents would be provided within the 
prescribed time.  Yeghiazaryan thus is inapplicable here. 
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Moreover, an allegation of a due process violation must ordinarily be accompanied 
by a showing of substantial prejudice.  See, e.g., Khan v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 448 F.3d 
226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006).  Hernandez’s claim of ineffective assistance of first counsel also 
requires a showing of prejudice.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d at 159.  We have 
carefully reviewed the original motion to reopen and supporting evidence and find no 
basis for concluding that Hernandez has suffered any prejudice, no matter how that term 
is defined.
1
  We agree with the Board that Hernandez’s claimed fear of returning to 
Mexico did not establish a prima facie case for a grant of asylum or withholding of 
removal.  See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988) 
(motion to reopen may be denied where alien fails to establish prima facie case for the 
relief sought).  The Board concluded that Hernandez failed to make a prima facie 
showing that his group -- non-gang, that is, non-drug-cartel, membership – is an 
immutable characteristic, see Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
2
  
The record fully supports the conclusion that Hernandez offered no evidence to show that 
                                              
1
 We reject as specious Hernandez’s argument that the Board failed to consider his 
evidence or failed to provide a meaningful explanation of its decision, as required by 
Zheng, 549 F.3d 260. 
2
 Acosta defines a “particular social group” as:  
 
[A] group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.  The 
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or 
in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership.  [W]hatever the common characteristic that defines 
the group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or consciences.  
 
19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
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this group shares common, immutable characteristics.  Cf. Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
665 F.3d 496, 504 (3d Cir. 2011) (alien who testified against members of violent gang is 
member of protectable social group of civilian witnesses, because all share common 
characteristic based on past conduct that cannot be undone).   
In addition, the State Department’s Travel Warning does not support a conclusion 
that the Government of Mexico would acquiesce in Hernandez’s torture.  This item states 
that most victims of the drug cartel violence are Mexican citizens associated with 
criminal activity.  A.R. 111-12.  It does note that some innocent bystanders have been 
killed in shoot-outs between the drug cartels and federal police, but that observation in no 
way supports a conclusion that Hernandez is more likely than not to be tortured with 
government acquiescence, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 
Accordingly, we find no basis, either in the claim of ineffective assistance of first 
counsel, or in the persecution claim, for concluding that Hernandez’s original motion to 
reopen should have been addressed on the merits.  Due process was not violated by the 
denial of Hernandez’s motion for reconsideration of the IJ’s May 2, 2011 decision 
denying his motion to reopen.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
